

# The Effect of Tax Incentives, Tax Rates, Tax Sanctions, and Services on Corporate Taxpayer Compliance Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic

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**Abstract**— Prior to and during the COVID-19 epidemic, this research intends to ascertain and analyze the impact of tax incentives, tax rates, tax sanctions, and services on corporate taxpayer compliance. Quantitative research methods are employed. Both the population and the sample are comprised of 100 corporate taxpayers registered at KPP Pratama Samarinda. Multiple linear regression analysis for the purpose of hypothesis testing. There were four main factors that affected corporate taxpayer compliance: 1) tax incentives had a positive and significant effect, with a significant value of 0.042; 2) tax rates had no effect, with a significant value of 0.471; 3) tax sanctions had a negative and insignificant effect, with a significant value of 0.506; and 4) service had a positive and significant effect, with a significant value of 0.042.

**Keywords**— Incentives, Tariffs, Sanctions, Tax Service, Taxpayer Compliance

## I. INTRODUCTION

The global health system has been severely tested by the Covid-19 pandemic or coronavirus sickness. The taxes industry is just one of many that will be impacted, along with the health sector. On March 2, 2020, Indonesia recorded the first incidence of covid-19. This epidemic is a catastrophe on a national scale, threatening employment and economic growth. Due to the government's enforcement of the Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB), currently known as the Enforcement of Restrictions on Community Activities (PPKM), certain businesses and MSMEs have been forced to close. The PPKM program is being used to reduce the number of new instances of covid-19, which has a significant negative effect on the Indonesian economy.

The Ministry of Labor found that nearly nine in ten businesses hit hard by the pandemic over the previous six months have been losing money. According to one online poll, nearly all of Indonesia's businesses have felt the effects of the covid-19 epidemic. Based on a probability sample with a 95% confidence interval and a margin of error (MoE) of 3.1%, it surveyed 1,105 businesses across 32 provinces in Indonesia by phone and email to compile this data. A study done by the Ministry of Manpower and INDEF found that MSMEs experienced a reduction in demand, production, and earnings of more than 90%. Businesses related to the hospitality sector, real

estate, and building construction have been struck the most (The Human Resources Department, 2020).

Eighty-two percent of MSMEs were negatively impacted by the epidemic, while only five percent saw growth. As a result of this situation, 63.9% of MSMEs saw a 30% drop in sales while 3.8% saw an increase. The information was collected through a survey administered by Katadata Insight Center (KIC) to 206 MSME participants in the Jabodetabek area. KIC data also demonstrates that MSMEs do considerable effort to preserve their current level of success. They have cut back in a number of ways to increase productivity, such as output, hours worked, headcount, and distribution networks. Some micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, however, have chosen the opposite tack and are relying on new marketing channels to stay afloat (Katadata, 2020)

TABLE I. Samarinda Tax Revenue Performance

Regional Office / Tax Office	Tax Year	Target (Rp)	Realization (Rp)	Realization (%)	Increase/Decrease
KPP Samarinda Ulu	2019	1,403,457,993,000	1,275,153,765,559	90.86%	0.00%
	2020	1,133,693,932,000	1,066,928,993,585	94.11%	-16.33%
	2021	1,090,587,635,000	1,279,704,204,891	117.34%	19.94%
KPP Samarinda Ilir	2019	1,598,170,698,000	1,523,976,129,435	95.36%	0.00%
	2020	1,259,773,430,000	1,247,360,167,930	99.01%	-18.15%
	2021	1,063,379,389,000	1,077,870,319,815	101.36%	-13.59%

Source: data processed, (2022)

Table 1 above shows that tax realization has decreased in 2020 for KPP Samarinda Ulu by -16.33% and KPP Samarinda Ilir by -18.15%. Then in 2021 KPP Samarinda Ulu experienced an increase from the previous year of 19.94% and KPP Samarinda Ilir experienced an increase but was still in the minus number, namely -13.59%. When viewed, tax realization still does not reach the predetermined state budget target. In this case, it can be summarized that the willingness and awareness of the public, especially taxpayers, to pay taxes is still relatively low during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The administration, like the rest of us, is panicked by the pandemic that has broken out. Government Regulation No.1 of 2020 Concerning State Financial Policy and Financial System Stability for Handling the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) Pandemic and/or in the Context of Facing Threats to the National Economy and/or Financial System Stability and

Related Matters was published in March 2020. Notice to Affected Taxpayers Regarding Tax Relief Due to the Covid-19 Virus Pandemic (PMK 23/PMK.03/2020). Income Tax Article 21, which covers taxes paid by employees, Income Tax Article 22, which covers taxes paid on imported goods, Income Tax Article 25, which covers tax payments, and Value Added Tax Article 26, which covers the restitution of overpaid VAT, all benefit from these tax breaks. As of April 1, 2020, the rule was officially in effect. The government is providing this incentive in response to a decrease in corporate productivity.

First Federal Law of the Year 2020 If your business or personal finances don't close until after the 2019 tax year ends on December 31, then you need to file your annual SPT for 2019 by April 30, 2020. SPT documentation due to DGT by no later than June 30, 2020, may be submitted late with an extension. Complete financial statements and other documents for the Annual Tax Return required by Director General of Taxes Regulation Number: 02/PJ/2019 must be submitted using the corrective tax return form by June 30, 2020. While there will be no penalty for filing a yearly tax return late, there will be a two percent per month interest penalty for any underpayment made on or after April 30, 2020.

The government provides various tax incentives, such as extending the deadline for submitting reimbursement claims, objection applications, and applications for reduction of administrative sanctions, to encourage taxpayers (WP) to exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations under PERPU Number 1 of 2020, as amended by Law Number 2 of 2020. The Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) in Indonesia made the decision to temporarily suspend face-to-face service at all Integrated Service Points (TPT) in Tax Service Offices (KPP) during the covid-19 outbreak. This temporary exclusion also applies to services provided by One Stop Integrated Services (PTSP) and Offsite Services (LDK), except for direct services at VAT Refund counters at airports which remain open with certain restrictions. This temporary closure of service provision is enforced from March 16 to April 5, 2020. In an effort to curb the spread of the coronavirus, the government has made this choice. The spread of the coronavirus has been so widespread that the World Health Organization (WHO) has classified it as a pandemic.

Based on what the researchers described above, the authors are interested in finding out more about the policies issued by the government related to tax incentives, tax rates, tax sanctions, and services on corporate taxpayer compliance. So that it is the background for researchers to raise the title "The Effect of Tax Incentives, Tax Rates, Tax Sanctions and Services on Corporate Taxpayer Compliance Before and During the Covid-19 Pandemic."

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### *Tax Incentives*

Any incentive that decreases a company's tax burden with the goal of encouraging the company to engage in a particular project or industry is considered a tax incentive, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2011). According to Syukur (2020), tax incentives are a form of provision offered to eligible investment projects that reflects

a deviation advantage from the rules applicable to investment projects in general. Tax breaks, then, have as their defining characteristic the fact that they are limited to selected projects. According to Garner (2004:1502), Incentive to Taxpayers is Incentives provided by the government in the form of tax breaks in order to encourage citizens to carry out certain actions, such as making donations to nonprofit organizations. To provide money or property to a qualified activity in exchange for a tax break is an example of a government offer. The author concludes that tax incentives are the government's efforts to increase investment by providing measurable facilities by the government to the private sector in order to attract new investment and maintain existing investment, and that the government also provides tax incentives to stabilize the country's economy amidst the impact of the corona virus. There are two main categories of investment incentives: tax breaks and other government subsidies. Facilities that the government provides but are not paid for out of the State Budget (APBN) are considered non-fiscal incentives, whereas facilities that are paid for out of the APBN are considered fiscal incentives. Governments often promise businesses non-monetary advantages, such as easier licensing procedures, improved infrastructure, and the elimination of unauthorized taxes. Investing may be enticed in various ways, each with its own set of benefits. Tax breaks for investors fall under the category of "fiscal incentives," while "financial incentives" and "other incentives" fill out the rest of the spectrum. There are six distinct forms of tax breaks, as outlined by Syukur (2020):

1. Lower tax rates (*reduce corporate income tax rates*)
2. Tax holiday
3. Investment allowances and tax credits
4. Accelerated depreciation
5. Exemptions from indirect taxes
6. Export processing zones

### *Tax Rate*

The rate at which taxes are levied on taxpayers' taxable property or income is known as the tax rate (Maulida, 2018). Typically, the percentage by which one is taxed is predetermined by the government. This was found by Tawas et al. in 2016 A tax rate, or percentage determined in accordance with tax legislation, is applied to a taxpayer's taxable income in order to establish the total amount of tax due. Generally speaking, tax rates in Indonesia are calculated using a percentage (%), while there are other nominal tax rates. Statute The Income Tax Law (Law No. 36 of 2008). In accordance with Article 17 of the law, Indonesia imposes a progressive tax rate on income, while a proportionate tax rate of 10% is applied to value added tax. Taxes are levied on taxpayers whose burden is commensurate with their ability to pay (ability to pay) and in line with the benefits obtained. This means that the rate must be determined justly and tax collection must be fair and equitable. Because of this, a tax rate is required to ensure that tax collection is fair to both the public and the government, with neither being unduly burdened by the other. The types of tariffs are as follows.

*a. Comparable or proportional rates*

In order to ensure that tax payments are appropriate to the value that is being taxed, a flat percentage rate is applied to all taxable amounts. Taxable items delivered within the customs area are subject to a 10% value-added tax, for instance.

*b. Flat rate*

With a uniform rate applied to all taxable income, the total tax bill is always known in advance. For instance, checks and bilyet giro of any nominal value incur a stamp duty rate of Rp. 3,000.00.

*c. Progressive Tariff*

According to Article 17 of the Income Tax Law for domestic individual taxpayers, for instance, the percentage rate utilized increases as the amount subject to tax rises.

*Tax Sanctions*

Given the coercive nature of taxes, the state provides sanctions for every taxpayer who does not make tax payments. The end goal is for taxpayers to be very aware of their tax responsibilities and very compliant with them. The 2018 study by Paramaduhita and Mustikasari, the TP engages in a process of interpretation on tax sanctions in which they attempt to make sense of information gleaned from a variety of sources. There are two types of tax penalties: those imposed by the administration, and those imposed by the criminal justice system, such as jail. The process by which taxpayers try to make sense of information gleaned from a variety of sources and come to their own conclusions concerning tax sanctions can be translated as "tax interpretation." There are two types of penalties that can be imposed for tax offenses: administrative penalties and incarceration penalties. Researchers Jotopurnomo et al. (2013) in the same way that sanctions are a form of negative punishment for those who break the rules, tax sanctions are a form of negative punishment for those who break the rules by having to pay money. As is the case with tax legislation, there must be consequences for those who break the law. There are two types of tax penalties described in Law No. 28 of 2007 concerning General Provisions of Taxation (KUP Law): administrative penalties and criminal penalties. Given that the government of Indonesia has recently instituted a self-assessment system in the context of executing tax collection, familiarity with punishments in taxes is crucial. Individuals and businesses are trusted to figure out their own tax obligations and remit the correct amount. The Taxation Law contains guidelines that were drafted by the government itself. The main purpose of tax penalties is to ensure that taxpayers fulfill their tax responsibilities. Classes of monetary penalties. The Indonesian penal code is codified in the General Provisions and Tax Procedures Law (KUP Law) No. 28 of 2007. This law governs both administrative and criminal penalties.

*Services*

As stated by Jotopurnomo et al. (2013), taxation services are those offered by the Directorate General of Taxes to taxpayers in an effort to facilitate their compliance with tax law. To qualify as public services, tax services must be provided by a government agency, serve the public interest in furtherance of the rule of law, and not be primarily concerned with making a

profit. Public service is defined in Indonesian Law No. 25 of 2009 concerning Public Services (2009) as any action or series of actions taken by a public service provider to meet the needs of citizens and residents for goods, services, and/or administrative services in a manner consistent with applicable laws and regulations. Public service providers must adhere to the principles outlined in Article 4 of this law, which include: public interest, legal certainty, equal rights, a balance of rights and obligations, professionalism, participation, equality of treatment/nondiscrimination, transparency, accountability, accessibility, facilities, special treatment for vulnerable groups, timeliness, convenience, affordability, and speed.

Detailed in Circular Letter No. SE-84/PJ/2011 from the Director General of Taxes on His or Her Own Superior Service. A high degree of public trust in taxation services depends, in part, on the Directorate General of Taxes' (DGT) ability to boost taxpayers' and all taxation stakeholders' satisfaction. This is in accordance with the requirements of Law Number 25 Year 2009 on Public Service and the instructions of the President of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the fight against all types of crime and irregularities and the enhancement of DGT's performance results. Increasing taxpayers' satisfaction with tax services requires, among other things, better service for them. From this, the author draws the conclusion that tax services are activities performed by government agencies and tax officials to meet the demands of the community (taxpayers) by giving a good and attractive attitude to achieve community satisfaction (taxpayers).

*Taxpayer Compliance*

To be in compliance with tax laws and regulations means to know or attempt to know how to comply with them, to fill out tax forms accurately and completely, to calculate the correct amount of tax due, and to pay that amount on time (Jotopurnomo et al., 2013). God requires both the government and the people to pay their fair share of taxes and use their tax rights in a responsible manner (Tahar and Rachman, 2014). When a taxpayer acts in accordance with the law, it is because he is aware of his legal responsibilities as a taxpayer. Additional categories of compliance are distinguished by Nurmantu in Satyawati & Cahjono (2017).

1. Formal Compliance, the term "formal compliance" refers to when taxpayers formally meet their tax responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of the tax legislation. The annual tax return submission due date is one such example.
2. Material Compliance, if a taxpayer is said to be in material compliance, it means that they have complied with all of the relevant requirements of the tax legislation. Therefore, taxpayers that meet material compliance in completing tax returns are those who do so in an open and truthful manner, using the appropriate forms, and submitting them to the Tax Service Office (KPP) on time.

Currently, Indonesia uses a self-assessment system for collecting taxes, which means that the taxpayer is responsible for keeping any and all records necessary to calculate his own tax bill, which he reports on his own Tax Return (SPT). Taxpayers calculate their yearly tax liability by first transferring the original rate to the Tax Imposition Base and



then subtracting any tax that has already been paid in the current year, which is known as Tax Credit, and the result is either tax that has been Underpaid, Nil Paid, or Overpaid. This system was implemented in conjunction with tax reform in 1983 after the issuance of Law Number 6 of 1983 concerning General Provisions and Procedures for Taxation, which went into effect on January 1, 1984. In this system, taxpayers are involved since they have the authority to determine their own tax liability, make deposits or payments, and file returns (Harahap, 2020). The taxpayer is responsible for determining their own tax liability, as well as calculating, depositing, and reporting such liability in line with applicable law (Mustaqiem, 2014). Based on the existing taxation theory, there are actually 4 (four) tax collection systems, namely: *official assessment system, semi-self-assessment system, self-assessment system and withholding system.*

*Hypothesis*

- H1 = Tax incentives have a positive effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the *covid-19* pandemic.
- H2 = Tax rates have a positive effect on corporate taxpayers before and during the *Covid-19* pandemic.
- H3 = Tax sanctions have a positive effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the *covid-19* pandemic.
- H4 = Services have a positive effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the *covid-19* pandemic.
- H5 = Tax incentives, tax rates, tax penalties, and services have a positive effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the *covid-19* pandemic.

III. RESEARCH METHOD

Quantitative techniques based on primary sources are used in this investigation. Primary data is information that has not been filtered by any intermediaries, such as questionnaires or interviews. The questionnaire's respondents were polled for their thoughts on various indicators connected to the variables under scrutiny. The respondents used a modified Likert scale with four options to indicate their level of agreement with various items. A Likert scale is a method of rating candidates on a scale. At the data processing step, four distinct statistical method analyses will be applied to the questionnaire data. Participants in this study are businesses with Taxpayer Identification Numbers that are registered with the Tax Service Office (KPP) in the Samarinda region. Purposive sampling was used to pick the sample, with the criteria being taxpayers that are required to have an NPWP and are registered as corporate taxpayers at the KPP in the Samarinda area. Although there was a total of 100 (one hundred) respondents who fit the research criteria, the majority of those who participated were men (63 in total, or 63%). The next largest group, at 37 respondents (37%), were all women. 42 participants (42%) were between the ages of 26 and 35, making up the largest age group. The majority of responders (56 out of a total of 96) had completed only the first year of secondary school. Then followed by respondents who had other positions, namely 27 people (27%). and continued based on the filling of tax returns, most of the taxpayers filled their own tax returns, namely 54 people (54%).

IV. RESEARCH RESULT

SPSS version 25 was used to analyze the data and determine the reliability of this study. If the findings of the validity analysis with 100 respondents are satisfactory, then the following step, a data reliability analysis, will be taken.

TABLE II. Tax Incentive Validity Test Results

Question Item	Correlated items - Correlated Total	r-table	Description
1	0.552	0.1996	Valid
2	0.447	0.1996	Valid
3	0.561	0.1996	Valid
4	0.588	0.1996	Valid
5	0.409	0.1996	Valid
6	0.640	0.1996	Valid
7	0.696	0.1996	Valid
8	0.556	0.1996	Valid
9	0.369	0.1996	Valid
10	0.597	0.1996	Valid

Each of the 10 indicators/statements employed by the tax incentive variable has a r-count value > r-table 0.1996; so, it can be assumed that these indicators/questions are genuine.

TABLE III. Tax Rate Validity Test Results

Question Item	Correlated items - Correlated Total	r-table	Description
1	0.568	0.1996	Valid
2	0.385	0.1996	Valid
3	0.530	0.1996	Valid
4	0.591	0.1996	Valid
5	0.638	0.1996	Valid
6	0.685	0.1996	Valid
7	0.565	0.1996	Valid
8	0.730	0.1996	Valid
9	0.341	0.1996	Valid
10	0.503	0.1996	Valid

Because each indicator/question has a r-count value greater than r-table 0.1996, it may be stated that the ten indicators/statements employed by the tax rate variable are accurate.

TABLE IV. Tax Sanction Validity Test Results

Question Item	Correlated items - Correlated Total	r-table	Description
1	0.524	0.1996	Valid
2	0.583	0.1996	Valid
3	0.536	0.1996	Valid
4	0.578	0.1996	Valid
5	0.346	0.1996	Valid
6	0.510	0.1996	Valid
7	0.650	0.1996	Valid
8	0.730	0.1996	Valid
9	0.568	0.1996	Valid
10	0.431	0.1996	Valid

The calculations show that the tax sanction variable may be trusted, as each of its 10 indicators/statements has a r-count > r-table value of 0.1996.

Each of the 10 questions/indicators utilized by the service variable has a value of r-count > r-table 0.1996, therefore the calculation concludes that they are all correct.

TABLE V. Service Validity Test Results

Question Item	Correlated items - Correlated Total	r-table	Description
1	0.304	0.1996	Valid
2	0.405	0.1996	Valid
3	0.334	0.1996	Valid
4	0.452	0.1996	Valid
5	0.477	0.1996	Valid
6	0.652	0.1996	Valid
7	0.755	0.1996	Valid
8	0.687	0.1996	Valid
9	0.669	0.1996	Valid
10	0.697	0.1996	Valid

TABLE VI. Taxpayer Compliance Validity Test Results

Question Item	Correlated items - Correlated Total	r-table	Description
1	0.653	0.1996	Valid
2	0.748	0.1996	Valid
3	0.676	0.1996	Valid
4	0.675	0.1996	Valid
5	0.614	0.1996	Valid
6	0.874	0.1996	Valid
7	0.864	0.1996	Valid
8	0.866	0.1996	Valid
9	0.836	0.1996	Valid
10	0.584	0.1996	Valid

Results from the calculations show that the ten indicators/statements employed by the taxpayer compliance variable are reliable, with an average r-count > r-table value of 0.1996 for each indicator/question.

Table VII. Reliability Test Results

Variables	Cronbach Alpha	Description
Tax Incentives	0.735	Reliable
Tax Rate	0.741	Reliable
Tax Sanctions	0.736	Reliable
Services	0.752	Reliable
Corporate Taxpayer Compliance	0.909	Reliable

All indicators utilized by the variables in the study are trustworthy, as calculated by generating a Cronbach's alpha value > 0.6, as shown by the results of the calculations.

TABLE VIII. Normality Test Results

		Unstandardized Residual
N		100
Normal Parameters <sup>a,b</sup>	Mean	0.0000000
	Std. Deviation	4.79508279
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	0.085
	Positive	0.085
	Negative	-0.064
Test Statistic		0.085
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.073 <sup>c</sup>

Since the significance level (0.073) is greater than the critical value (0.05), we conclude that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test value is normally distributed.

TABLE IX. Multicollinearity Test Results

Variables	Collinearity Statistics		Description
	Tolerance	VIF	
Tax Incentives	0.510	1.959	No Multicollinearity
Tax Rate	0.503	1.986	No Multicollinearity
Tax Sanctions	0.599	1.669	No Multicollinearity
Services	0.525	1.903	No Multicollinearity

Results produced tolerance value > 0.1 and VIF value 10 on all independent variables, indicating that no multicollinearity symptoms were present in this investigation (see table above for details).

TABLE X. Linearity Test Results

Variables	Deviation from Linearity	Description
Tax Incentives	0.143	Linear
Tax Rate	0.520	Linear
Tax Sanctions	0.160	Linear
Services	0.596	Linear

Testing with SPSS revealed a significant value of departure from linearity for all variables > 0.05, as shown in the table above, indicating that all independent variables in this study are linearly related.

TABLE XI. Heteroscedasticity Test Results

Variables	Significant Value	Description
Tax Incentives	0.772	No Heteroscedasticity
Tax Rate	0.289	No Heteroscedasticity
Tax Sanctions	0.580	No Heteroscedasticity
Services	0.140	No Heteroscedasticity

After running the data through SPSS, the above table shows that there are no signs of heteroscedasticity across any of the independent variables.

*Hypothesis Test Results*

In this study, using a significance level / tolerable error rate ( $\alpha$ ) of 0.05 or 5% and which uses a *one-tailed* procedure because the hypothesis has been given a positive and negative direction. Therefore, the minimum *cut-off value* used in testing this hypothesis is 1.985. As for this hypothesis testing, there are two criteria for drawing conclusions, with the following description:

- The decision that the research hypothesis that has been formulated is "rejected" when the t-count value found after the calculation is less than the predetermined *cut-off value*, which is 1.985 (t-count < 1.985) and is not significant if (p values > 0.05).
- The decision that the research hypothesis that has been formulated is "accepted" when the t-value found after the calculation is more than the predetermined *cut-off value*, which is 1.985 (t-statistics > 1.985) and significant if (p values < 0.05).

TABLE XII. Test results

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	4.999	4.956		1.009	.316
	Tax Incentives	.372	.181	.252	2.059	.042
	Tax Rate	.154	.212	.089	.725	.471
	Tax Sanctions	-.117	.176	-.075	-.667	.506
	Services	.463	.181	.309	2.564	.012

Based on the table above, the regression equation in this study is as follows.

$$Y = 4,999 + 0,372 X_1 + 0,154 X_2 - 0,117 X_3 + 0,463 X_4 + 4,956$$

TABLE XIII. F Test Results

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	858.301	4	214.575	8.955	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residuals	2276.289	95	23.961		
Total	3134.590	99			

The findings of the preceding data processing show that  $F_{count} > F_{table} = 8.955 > 2.47$  has a significant probability value of 0.000 < 0.05. Corporate taxpayer compliance (Y) is significantly impacted by tax incentive (X1), tax rate (X2), tax sanction (X3), and service (X4) interaction tests.

TABLE XIV. Results of the Coefficient of Determination

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.523 <sup>a</sup>	0.274	0.243	4.895

Results from the calculation of the coefficient of determination are shown in the table above, where the value of the coefficient of determination (Adjusted R Square) is found to be 0.243. This suggests that the variables of Tax Incentives, Tax Rates, Tax Sanctions, and Services can explain 24.3% of the Corporate Taxpayer Compliance variable, whereas the remaining 75.7% is influenced by additional factors outside the scope of this study.

Discussion

Since the original sample value is positive (0.372 > 0), the t-count value is positive (2.059 > 1.985), and the significance value is positive (0.42 > 0.05), we accept the null hypothesis that tax incentives have no effect on taxpayer compliance. It follows that the hypothesis is true and significant based on the calculated results. Therefore, the first supposition is correct. Since the first hypothesis is supported by the data, it follows that the government's tax incentives during the pandemic had a sizable impact on taxpayer compliance. This indicates that the greater the tax incentives or tax facilities in the form of a lower tax rate for taxpayers, the more likely it is that taxpayers will take advantage of them, the lighter the tax burden borne so that it can cause a feeling of pleasure when paying taxes on time and taxpayers are not subject to tax sanctions or warnings. The Minister of Finance stated that tax incentives have been used to increase purchasing power, help liquidity and business continuity. The state's financial policy aimed at accelerating the response to the Covid 19 outbreak and other dangers to the economy and financial system is consistent with the national economic recovery program, which is why tax incentives are being offered.

Because the t-count value is 0.725 < 1.985 and the significance value is 0.471 > 0.05, we reject H2 that the tax rate has a positive and insignificant effect on taxpayer compliance. The original sample value for H2 is 0.154 > 0, which is positive. Since the computation showed no effect of the tax rate on taxpayer compliance, the conclusion is drawn. This means that taxpayers continue to believe that compliance in paying taxes will diminish if the tax rate is quite high since they will opt to be overdue or simply not pay taxes.

Because the original sample value is negative (0.117 > 0), the t-count value is negative (0.667 < 1.985), and the significance value is negative (0.506 > 0.05), we can conclude

that the third hypothesis, which states that tax sanctions have a negative and insignificant effect on taxpayer compliance, is false. Consequently, it is determined that the tax sanction variable granted to taxpayers who breach tax regulations does not dissuade them from repeating the offense based on the findings of the computation. This is because actions on these violations have not been dealt with firmly by government officials, despite the fact that tax sanctions are recognized in rules. As a result of this phenomena, taxpayers mistakenly believe that legal sanctions are the only kind of tax punishment.

Even though the original sample value is positive (0.463 > 0), the t-count value is significantly higher (2.564 > 1.985), and the significance value is significantly smaller (0.012 < 0.05), so the fourth hypothesis that tax services have a significant positive effect on taxpayer compliance is rejected. It follows that taxpayer compliance, in the form of timely payment and reporting, may be influenced by the availability of tax services during a pandemic. When tax authorities offer taxpayers tax services, they are doing so to assist taxpayers in meeting or preparing for all of their tax obligations. Taxpayer excitement for paying their fair share of the treasury rises in direct proportion to the quality of the services, amenities, and infrastructure made available to them. In accordance with Director General of Taxes Circular Letter Number: SE-84 / PJ / 2011 Regarding Outstanding Service by the Director General of Taxes, the following is provided. Efforts are being made to increase taxpayer satisfaction with tax services by enhancing the quality of service provided to them.

The F-count value of 8.955 > F-table 2.47 and the significance value of 0.000 < 0.05 indicate statistical significance in favor of the fifth hypothesis, which argues that tax incentives, tax rates, tax penalties, and services have a significant positive effect on taxpayer compliance. The calculation proved the hypothesis to be true, hence the conclusion reached is authoritative.

V. CONCLUSION

Research undertaken on the impact of tax incentives, tax rates, tax sanctions, and services on corporate taxpayer compliance prior to and during the Covid 19 pandemic led to the following conclusions.

1. The results showed that tax incentives had a significant positive effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the covid-19 pandemic.
2. The results showed that tax rates had no significant effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the Covid-19 pandemic.
3. The results showed that tax sanctions had no significant positive effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.
4. The results showed that service had a significant positive effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.
5. The results showed that tax incentives, tax rates, tax sanctions and services had a joint (simultaneous) effect on corporate taxpayer compliance before and during the co-19 pandemic.

Further research is expected to add other variables that can affect taxpayer compliance such as taxpayer motivation, taxpayer awareness, taxpayer knowledge, taxpayer understanding. Future research is suggested to be conducted with case studies outside Samarinda, such as Balikpapan and Tenggarong. Samarinda Primary Service Tax Office is expected to improve service quality and conduct regular socialization.

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